
Introduction of the Domain Issuer in OMA DRM

DRM workshop CCNC 2007

Paul Koster, Javier Montaner, Sorin Iacob, Najib Koraichi Philips Research, Vodafone R&D .NL, Telematica Instituut Mobile Enabled Secure Exchange of Content January 11, 2007






Philips Research, Vodafone R&D .NL, Telematica Instituut, January 11, 2007


OMA DRM 2.0 Domain Architecture

- Rights Issuers define Domains consisting of DRM Agents
- Rights Issuers issue Rights Objects
 bound to Domains
- DRM Agents exchange Rights
 Objects (and Content) out-of-band
- →People can use their content on all their (domain) devices



Multiple Rights Issuers cause confusion

- People buy their OMA DRM content at multiple shops.
- No uniform behavior on all devices
 - Some content plays on all
 - Other content first requires online Join Domain
 - inconvenient and confusing for offline cases, e.g. mobile music players or memory cards



Multiple Rights Issuers cause inconvenience


Rights Issuers have a domain policy • RI₁ User manually synchronize domains ٠ - Requires work **RI** Registration Join/Leave Domain KD, **RO** Acquisition domain limit reached Although process is easy when done on first rendering attempt RO, - Impossible in cases where one DA_ DA_R RO, (out-of band) domain reached the maximum Non-overlapping set of DAs Domain, Consistency expected ۲ $\mathbf{DA}_{\mathbf{C}}$ DA_D

RI,

Domain,


Introduction of the Domain Issuer in OMA DRM

- Single shared Domain Issuer improves
 user convenience
 - Enables user to have one domain.
 - One Join Domain between DA and DI ensures that DA can render all content issued by participating RIs.




Architecture

- One or more DIs
 - One: practical, clearer $\sqrt{}$
 - More: confusing, inconvenient
- Domain key management
 - DK per DI: DI control, practical $\sqrt{}$
 - DK per RI: No efficient DK distribution
- DI, RI and DA communication
 - Protocols limited to 2 parties: operational independence, robust $\sqrt{}$
 - Proxy requests, etc.: less robust



Example interaction




Requirements

Prevent negative effects on RI and protect DI interests:

- The DI should play an essential role in key management for his domains so that it cannot be bypassed.
- The DI should be able to stop the use of domain functionality when the business relationship with RI ends.
- The RI shall trust the DI but should not need to trust other RIs that issue content for the same domain.
- Non-trusted devices should be revocable from a domain in order to secure future domain content.
- Content issued by other RIs should not be affected when a RI is revoked.


Domain key diversification

- Diversified Domain Keys (KD_i) per RI_i
 - DI control
 - RI independence
- KD_i derived from Master Domain Key (KD).
 KD shared by DI and DAs. KD not available to RIs.
 - DI and DA calculate KD_i using RI Registration KD_i = first 128 bits of HMAC-SHA1(PubKeyRI, KD) RO,
 - RI_i obtains KD_i via Use Domain protocol
 - RI_i encrypts RO with KD_i




ValidationToken

- Diversified domain keys do not confine a KD_i to one RI and have limited revocation options
- Validation Tokens (VT) entitle RIs to issue ROs to DAs belonging to domains of a DI.
 - DI control
- Operation
 - DI (periodically) creates VT_i
 - VT_i = {ExpiresAfter, RI_i PublicKey}_{signedDIPrivateKey}
 - RI, obtains VT, via Use Domain protocol
 - RI_i embeds VT_i in RO
 - DA verifies VT_i using DI context



DeviceMAC

- ValidationTokens do not prevent RI to issue ROs out-of-band
 - Using old VT
 - DAs cannot verify compliance of RI
- DeviceMAC asserts that RI had a valid nonexpired VT and was non-revoked at RO acquisition
 - DI control
 - Proof RI compliance to DA
- Operation
 - DA obtains RO and VT from RI
 - DA computes DeviceMAC: DeviceMAC = HMAC-SHA1(RO, KD)
 - DA embeds DeviceMAC in RO
 - DAs validate DeviceMAC for ROs received out of band.



Evaluation

- Requirements met
 - Solution addresses business requirements of both DI and RI
 - However strong dependence on DI
- Security is comparable with OMA DRM 2.0
 - Domain keys protect content keys
 - Domain key updates protect future content
 - Compliance / revocation supported
 - However, DI has master domain keys

Conclusions

- Separate Domain Issuer increases user friendliness.
- Limited changes to OMA DRM 2.0.
- Security mechanism to support independent roles of DI and RIs.
- Future work
 - transfer of domain (keys) from one DI to another
 - rights/domain management local to devices



Q&A

